On October 14th, the Venice Commission (VC) and Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law of the Council of Europe (“DGI”) issued a landmark joint Opinion on European standards regulating the status of judges, on the basis of four questions raised by the Minister of Justice of Poland on the issue of neo-judges in Poland. This issue stems from the appointment of over 2,500 judges through a politicised National Council of the Judiciary (KRS), reconstituted in 2017 in the context of far-reaching judicial reforms introduced by the then ruling Law and Justice party (PiS), which had been found by the VC, in a 2017 Opinion, to “enable the legislative and executive powers to interfere in a severe and extensive manner in the administration of justice, and thereby pose a grave threat to the judicial independence as a key element of the rule of law”. In the same vein, European and Polish courts had continued addressing fundamental concerns raised about judicial independence in Poland, ruling on multiple occasions that neo-judges do not meet independence standards.
In July 2024, the Polish Minister of Justice, Adam Bodnar seized the Venice Commission with four questions linked to two models to address the issue of neo-judges, with a view to reducing the risk that the chosen solution may conflict with the ECHR and EU law. Without assessing directly the models proposed, the assessment of the Venice Commission concludes that a wholesale invalidation ex tunc of all the appointment decisions of the Polish NCJ (and thus a blanket return of all neo-judges to their previous positions) does not fit into the rule of law concept, as it would among others fail the proportionality test and the principle of separation of powers. Instead, the VC recommends adopting a case-by-case approach (which does not necessarily mean an individual approach, but can also involve considering grouped categories (“cohorts”) of similar appointments, in any event on the basis of pre-established criteria), giving the right to affected judges to seek judicial review against the invalidation of their nomination or promotion in case the decisions on invalidation are not taken by a judicial body.
While reaffirming the importance of legal certainty, the Opinion acknowledges that there may be circumstances in which the reassignment of a judge to another position (including the possibility of delegating judges to the courts where they served prior to the enactment of the impugned law) is unavoidable. Yet, transitional arrangements that may be needed have to be surrounded by adequate guarantees. The Opinion finally concludes that a number of safeguards should be put in place to guarantee an adequate balance between the principles of court established by law as element of fair trial and res judicata as element of legal certainty. These include, inter alia, the provision of a mechanism that would be suitable for a fairly rapid settlement of the issue and would introduce time limits to the cases that can be challenged.
Relevance of the VC Opinion for the implementation of ECtHR cases related to the independence of the Polish judiciary
During the EIN Rule of Law Conference which took place in The Hague last June, the issue of the independence of the Polish Judiciary was discussed alongside the role that the VC could play in Poland carrying out the judicial reform in accordance with European standards. Dr. Bodnar had discussed the status of reforms and measures required for the implementation of European Court judgments concerning the independence of the Polish judiciary, as well as the important challenges that need to be overcome along the way.
He notably stressed out the need for guidelines to shape rule of law-upholding efforts and the importance of involving all legal and political forces in this process, including civil society and international actors. In Dr. Bodnar’s view, the binding nature of the Convention standards and the Court’s case-law cannot be disregarded. It is a fundamental obligation of members states, and Poland must take into account existing jurisprudence of the ECtHR and their implementation in the context of the judicial reform. The Venice Commission echoes this position by linking its Opinion first and foremost with Poland’s obligation to execute the judgments of the ECtHR, while respecting international and constitutional standards.
Further, the Opinion of the Venice Commission reflects the thrust of the recommendations formulated by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in relation with the Reczkowicz v. Poland group of cases during the September 2024 EIN civil society briefing, in particular concerning the introduction of a fair procedure for individual verification of appointments before an independent NCJ, with a right of appeal to court. This group of cases concerns the procedurally flawed judicial appointments, undermining the independence and legality of the judicial bodies involved in deciding the applicants' cases. It is one of the most important rule of law-related cluster of Polish cases currently supervised by the Committee of Ministers (CM) of the Council of Europe. At the September 2024 CM-DH meeting, the Committee of Ministers – having called for a comprehensive reform addressing the status of deficiently appointed judges and the status of judgments adopted with their participation – noted that the authorities were seeking advice from the Venice Commission and called on them to elaborate and adopt the reform without further delay, to ensure the required urgent remedial action and address the grave underlying problems.
The Opinion of the VC is therefore of strong importance in a twofold manner: It does not only serve as a guide for the planned judicial reform in Poland, which is expected to set an important precedent, and must therefore succeed in striking a fair balance between the rule of law and legal certainty principles; it is furthermore bound to help avoid future ECtHR violations by setting a roadmap to ensure that the balance between these two principles is maintained in a Convention-compliant manner, should similar concerns arise in other jurisdictions. Importantly, the Opinion ultimately reiterates the fundamental importance of respect for the binding nature of Article 46 of the Convention, even in the face of acute legal and political dilemmas, and serves as yet another reaffirmation of the role of the Venice Commission as a highly specialised international body that can assist the member States in navigating their responsibilities deriving from the Convention in the light of the subsidiary nature of the ECtHR judgments.